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Introduction
State trading emerged as one of the more contentious issues at the end of the Uruguay Round
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Nevertheless, state trading was
permitted to continue, and the only change in the 1994 agreement was that countries became subject to
stricter reporting requirements on the existence of state trading enterprises (STEs). The World Trade
Organization (WTO) is in the process of establishing a formal definition of state trading and has new
notification requirements, including information on the operation of these entities. The requirement remains
from previous agreements that state traders must abide by the same disciplines that apply to trade by
private firms under GATT.
As the new GATT agreement is being implemented under the auspices of the WTO, concern over
the behavior of state trading enterprises has increased, especially in the United States. Government officials
and industry associations in the United States are concerned that state traders may be able to increase
protection of domestic agricultural producers beyond GATT commitments in a disguised manner and to
subsidize exports or price-discriminate among trading partners, and so may not abide by the requirements
of GATT (Dixit and Josling). The current U.S. position is that state trading is an important issue for further
negotiation in the agricultural mini-round scheduled to begin in 1999 (Ackerman, Dixit and Simone). 
State trading enterprises are one common institutional mechanism through which trade is regulated
in order to achieve  domestic agricultural policy objectives of price stability, low prices for consumers and
high prices for producers.  State trading enterprises may be reformed without a fundamental change in the
objectives of a nation’s agricultural policy. Hence, it may well be the case that many aspects of trading
behavior would not change after reform or elimination of a state trading enterprise.Young and Abbott, pg. 2
There are two prominent concerns over importing STEs. One concern is that importing STEs may
restrict wheat imports, negating the potential liberalization brought about by the conversion of nontariff
trade barriers to tariffs (Dixit and Josling). A primary reason to restrict imports is to subsidize domestic
production by increasing prices above world market levels, frustrating the intent of limitations in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture which restricts those subsidies. Another concern is that
decisions regarding the source of the purchases of wheat may not be made on a commercial basis, for
political or other reasons (Blandford).
 Wheat state trading enterprises were chosen as a focus in this paper due to the importance of
wheat as a food grain and the prevalence over time of STEs in the world wheat market. A list of wheat
importers and their current and past use of STEs for importing wheat is provided in Table 1. The fifty-three
importers listed accounted for 73 percent of the wheat imported in 1996. Around 40 million metric tons
(mmt) (approximately 40 percent of total wheat trade) of wheat was imported by countries that are
identified here as having either STEs with a monopoly on imports or STEs that heavily influence the
domestic market. This is a marked decline from the 91.3 percent share of imports by countries using STEs
in the period 1973–77 that was estimated by Schmitz et al. (1981).
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the behavior of importing STEs in the world wheat
market compared to trade by private firms, either coexisting with an STE or replacing an STE as the entity
physically handling wheat trade. Our goal is to determine whether elimination or alteration of remaining
STEs, or regulations that may be placed on STEs in future negotiations under the World Trade
Organization, will substantively change trade behavior in world wheat markets.
Three hypotheses are investigated: (1) that operation of an STE is associated with a higher level
of protection than with private traders, (2) that countries where STEs handle trade are less responsive to
world market prices in the determination of import levels, and (3) that countries where STEs handle tradeYoung and Abbott, pg. 3
may be less responsive to prices differences between exporters and more likely to rigidly depend on
historical shares of import sources.  
Differences are examined at various points in time, between countries with STEs and those with
solely private trade, to ascertain differences between the two and how they have evolved over various




Whether STEs lead to a greater level of protection for wheat producers is investigated by
calculating effective tariffs over time for wheat for twenty-two countries from 1980 to 1995, except when
limited by data. An effective tariff is estimated as:
(1)  Teff = Pd / Pw-1
where Pd is the domestic producer price of wheat, and Pw is the world price of wheat.  For a detailed
discussion of the data see Abbott and Young (1997), and data sources are listed after the references. 
Table 2 reports the average and standard deviation of effective tariffs for 1980 through 1994, along
with averages for each country when its trade regime was an STE with monopoly power to import
(Monopolist), an STE coexisting with private firms that also handled imports (Coexist), and when private
firms handled all imports (Private). In countries where there was only one regime, the average for that
regime equals the overall average. When institutions changed, an average under each regime is reported,
permitting comparison of protection before and after reforms.
Changes in effective tariffs over time. There are several cases in which effective tariffs were lower
when private firms handled trade compared to when STE monopolies existed — Brazil, Colombia, Egypt,
Israel, and Poland. At the same time the opposite result is also evident; protection was lower under aYoung and Abbott, pg. 4
monopolist STE in Korea, Mexico, and Pakistan. In Peru little change in the effective tariff is evident, and
in most cases, the differences in the effective tariff by regime are small compared to its standard deviation,
making it impossible to find statistically significant differences in any case.
Comparisons across countries. Comparisons across countries using the effective tariffs in Table
2 indicate substantial variation among countries with similar institutional arrangements. Over the period
1980-1994 very high producer protection persisted in Algeria, Japan, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, while
negative rates of protection existed for producers in China and India, and all of these countries had STEs.
For countries with private trade the average effective rate of protection varied from -13 percent
to 260 percent, while for countries with monopolists, i.e. STEs, the average effective rate of protection
varied from -35 percent to 500 percent. Even if STEs are eliminated, or their market power is diminished,
high (and variable) rates of consumer or producer protection may persist, depending on the domestic
agricultural policy goals, and internal market conditions, of the country in question. If STEs are eliminated,
countries can find other means to divorce domestic prices from world prices and continue the desired level
of support for producers and consumers. 
Determinants of Import Demand
 A net import demand model is used to test the hypothesis that countries with state trading are less
sensitive to world price signals than private traders. The model is specified here as follows: 
(2)  M = C0 + C1 (Q + St-1) + C2 Pw + C3 Y + C4 Pop. 
The role of state trading enterprises in controlling import levels is assessed by comparing the effect
of supply (C1) and world price (C2) on imports across countries and institutions. For a state trader
stabilizing the domestic market C1 is expected to be negative, significant and close to one.  Under free
trade, the magnitude of C1 would be determined by short-run domestic supply and demand elasticities.Young and Abbott, pg. 5
Interaction dummy variables are used to test if responsiveness of import levels to world price change after
reforms occur. 
Results are reported in Table 3. The coefficient on world price is converted to be a net import
demand elasticity to facilitate interpretation.  These elasticities show that supply is very important in
determining imports, since its coefficient is significantly less than zero in fifteen cases. Often values
between zero and -1 are found, reflecting only partial adjustment to production shortfalls via trade. Most
countries also stabilize domestic markets using stocks, and some variation in consumption levels to market
conditions is evident.
Statistically significant coefficients on world price were found in seven out of twenty-seven
countries. Two of these countries, China and India, were always state traders, and one, Nigeria, was private
over the time span. A very low elasticity was found in India’s case due to the large local market. In several
cases where state trading has applied, very small or incorrectly signed coefficients are found, including
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Morocco, and Sri Lanka. These results support the notion that state traders
isolate their domestic markets from world prices. In another set of countries, Brazil, Costa Rica, Israel,
Malaysia, and Mexico, reasonably large coefficients with large standard errors were estimated. Three of
these countries experienced rapid inflation and reform at some point in time. Chile and Malaysia are also
two countries where private firms handled trade and yet domestic markets appeared isolated from world
markets. 
In four countries, the interaction dummy variables were significant. In each case, the coefficient
was positive, indicating reduced price responsiveness, and small relative to the overall influence of world
price. In general, these interaction dummies failed to demonstrate increased price responsiveness after
institutional reform. They may indicate an upward shift in the level of demand after reform, although such
effects are also small.Young and Abbott, pg. 6
In many cases these results support the notion that state traders often isolate their markets from
world market conditions and base import decisions on domestic needs. There are also several cases of
private traders that were responsive to world price, but there is little evidence that institutional reform
increased price responsiveness. While mixed, these results support the hypothesis, subject to the caveats
stated above, that there are ways without state trading to isolate markets, and significant changes in import
behavior do not necessarily coincide with institutional reform.   Further evidence related to this hypotheses
is presented in Abbott and Young (1997).  In that paper a price transmission model is used to investigate
the transmission of world prices into domestic markets. 
Exporter Market Share
The next hypothesis was that countries who engage in state trading may not treat all exporters
equally, favoring some suppliers for political or other reasons. A variation on an Armington market share
model was used to test this hypothesis:
(3)  Log(Mus/ M) = C0 + C1 Log(Mus/M) t-1 + C2 Log (Pus/Pw)
where Mus equals imports from the United States, so that Mus/M is U.S. market share in the import
market being modeled. Table 4 reports results for this model, along with a variant on it that included an
interaction dummy to identify the effects of institutional reform. 
In ten cases, significant coefficients on lagged market share C1 were found and in another four
cases, intermediate values for C1 that were not significant were also found. These cases show considerable
persistence in market share, supporting the hypothesis that products are differentiated by source and that
factors including politics could be determining the source of supply. Factors such as long-tem supply
contracts, and transactions cost due to switching suppliers could be equally important in accounting for
these results (Kallio). Six of these cases were always state traders, lending strong support to the notion thatYoung and Abbott, pg. 7
these institutions can add rigidity to exporter choice. One case, Malaysia, was always a private trader,
however, suggesting that inertia in market share is not confined to state traders. 
In five cases, the price ratio was significant and larger than one, which is still a low degree of
substitution by source. Four of those were countries undergoing reform, and one was a state trader. In five
cases where institutional reform occurred, a significant interaction dummy variable was found, suggesting
changes in market share determination after reform. In three of these cases, coefficients were positive,
however, indicating a shift in market share toward the United States, but not increased price
responsiveness. 
The empirical test of this hypothesis provides the strongest evidence of all the tests supporting
differences in behavior between state and private traders. Many state traders appear to rely on the same
source of supply over time. Although private traders and reforming countries generally showed more price
responsiveness, some private traders also were found to rely on the same exporter, demonstrating
insensitivity to price differences between exporters.
Conclusions
The strength of the empirical tests presented in this paper are limited by the small number of
countries that have never had a wheat-importing STE to compare with those who have, and by the limited
number of years since reform for countries that have changed their institutional arrangements. However,
several conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, there is no clear correlation between the existence
of an STE and the level of protection in a country. This result can be explained by the fact that other
policies and institutions can be used to accomplish these same goals. Being open to world markets is most
effectively accomplished by domestic policy reform, not by simply eliminating certain border institutions.
Results from the import demand equations indicate that many, but not all, state traders tend to isolateYoung and Abbott, pg. 8
domestic markets from world market conditions and that institutional reform has not necessarily led to an
increase in the role of price in making import decisions.
Investigation of the relationship between institutional structure and the importance of lagged market
share and price ratios gives some evidence that STEs may be less responsive to changes in market
conditions in choosing their sources of supply. However, it should be realized that the elimination of STEs
could result in both negative as well as positive changes for the United States, and the balance of these two
deserves further consideration.  It appears that these institutional features, rather than the level of
protection, deserve attention in the future.Young and Abbott, pg. 9
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Producer wheat price (Pd),
 World Wheat Price(Pw)





 Imports from the U.S.(Mus)
Production, Supply and Demand Database, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Population (Pop). Gross
National Product(Y),
Exchanges Rates, U.S. Gulf
Wheat Price (Pus)
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary FundYoung and Abbott, pg. 10
Table 1.  Institutions Involved in Wheat Imports
Country
STE name











Algeria OIAC Yes --- Nigeria unknown (eliminated) No 1996
Bangladesh FCM No 1992 North Korea unknown Yes ---
Bulgaria Zareni Chrani Yes expected
1997
Norway Statkorn (privatized) No 1995
Bolivia P.L. 480 Executive
Secretariate (coexist)
No --- Pakistan MFAC (coexists) No 1991
Brazil CTRIN (eliminated) No 1991 Peru ENCISA (coexists) No March 1991
Chile none No --- Philippines National Food Authority No 1986
China COFCO Yes --- Poland Agencja Rynku Rolnego
(coexist)
No June 1990
Colombia IDEMA (eliminated) No 1992 Romania Romecereal (eliminated) No June 1995





Cuba unknown Yes --- Saudi Arabia GSFMO Yes ---
Cyprus Cyprus Grain
Commission
Yes --- Singapore none No ---
Ecuador Ministry of Industry No 1991 Slovakia KOOSPOL (coexist) No 1990




No 1992 South Korea  KOFMIA No 1983
Hong Kong none No --- Sri Lanka Cooperative Wholesale
Establishment
Yes ---
India Food Corporation of
India
Yes --- Sudan  unknown Yes —
Indonesia BULOG Yes --- Taiwan TFMA No Jan. 1994






No 1989 Thailand none No ---
Japan MAFF Yes --- Tunisia Office des Cereales Yes ---
Jordan Ministry of Supply
(coexist)
No 1996 Turkey Turkish Grain Board
(coexist)
No ---
Kenya none No --- Uruguay none No ---
Libya unknown Yes --- Uzbekistan Uzmarkazimpex for
Uzkhleboproduckt
Yes ---
Malaysia none No --- Venezuela CORPOMERCADEO No 1989
Mauritius none No --- Yemen Ministry of Trade and
Supply (coexists)
No ---
Mexico CONASUPO No 1992 Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Board No 1996
Morocco ONICL No 1997Young and Abbott, pg. 11





Deviation  Private Coexists Monopolist
Algeria 139.037  (81.18 ) 139.037 
Bolivia 13.375  (16.75)   13.375 
Brazil 150.660  (115.35)   50.502  207.893 
Chile 15.082  (18.51)   15.083 
China -5.394  (12.27)   -5.394 
Colombia 54.707  (26.73)   38.803  58.683 
Egypt 45.926  (74.01)   32.376  48.010 
India -30.657  (15.53)   -30.657 
Iran 499.486  (473.23)   499.486 
Israel 37.078  (16.87)   29.380  48.624 
Japan 491.554  (162.72)   491.554 
Kenya 8.264  (27.01)   8.264 
Korea 189.974  (66.11)   259.908  182.345  117.073 
Mexico 16.552  (35.31)   48.750  11.599 
Morocco 110.417  (46.76)   110.417 
Nigeria 175.065  (120.71)   175.065 
Pakistan -30.251  (12.36)   -17.898  -35.866 
Peru 66.943  (53.32)   69.015  66.001 
Poland 19.472  (41.54)   -15.196  40.273 
Saudi Arabia 115.307  (30.71)   115.307 
Tunisia 58.422  (49.43)   58.422 
Turkey -6.553  (25.32)   -6.553 
Venezuela 7.714  (26.61)   -13.493  21.852 
AVERAGE 93.138  74.779  28.102  109.017 
     
aBased on import unit values.Young and Abbott, pg. 12
Table 3.  Net Import Demand
Country Supply (t-statistics) Pw (t-statistics)
Interaction
Dummy (t-statistics) Institution R
2
Algeria -0.726 (6.19)** -0.075  (-0.94) M 0.98 
Bolivia -0.404  (-0.37) 0.808  (1.02) C 0.53 
Brazil -0.798  (-4.66)** -0.565  (-1.35) 0.071  (2.26)* M+P 0.97 
Chile -0.931  (-7.07)** -0.075  (-1.25)   P 0.97 
Colombia -0.026  (-0.19) -0.072  (-0.59) 0.065  (4.22)** M+P 0.95 
Costa Rica -0.561  (-1.76) P 0.65 
China -0.381  (-5.37)**  -0.958  (-2.92)** M 0.81 
Egypt 0.055  (0.22) -0.336  (-2.60)**  -0.018  (-1.01) M+C 0.84 
India -0.138  (-2.19)* -0.003  (-2.02)* M 0.68 
Indonesia -0.115  (-0.58) M 0.97 
Iran -0.803  (-2.81)** 0.325  (1.15) M 0.70 
Israel -2.680  (-2.38)* -1.404  (-1.64) -0.018  (-0.38) M+P 0.83 
Japan -0.892  (-2.82)** 0.005  (0.08) M 0.79 
Kenya -1.083  (-3.02)** -1.019  (-1.50) C 0.82 





Malaysia -0.535  (-1.75) P 0.90 
Mexico -0.616  (-3.25)** -1.818  (-1.72) 0.304  (4.19)** M+P 0.86 
Morocco -0.710  (-3.85)** 0.003  (0.01) M 0.74 
Nigeria -0.755  (-5.32)** P 0.89 
Pakistan -0.365  (-2.36)** 1.121  (1.20) 0.066  (0.97) M+C 0.79 
Peru 0.537  (0.68) -0.925  (-3.30)** 0.082  (1.82)* M+P 0.79 
Philippines 0.188  (0.48) 0.015  (0.39) M+P 0.94 
Poland 0.030  (0.12) -0.340  (-2.91)** -0.008  (-0.14) M+C 0.89 
Sri Lanka -0.135  (-0.48) M 0.77 
Saudi Arabia -0.520  (-2.64)* 1.525  (1.32) M 0.91 
Tunisia -0.227  (-1.98)* -0.341  (-0.76) M 0.47 
Turkey -0.965  (-2.47)* 1.151  (0.56) C 0.73 
Note:  




Two and one asterisks (** and *) denote significance at the five and ten percent levels, respectively.Young and Abbott, pg. 13




Share (t-statistics) Price Ratio
a (t-statistics)
Interactio
n Dummy  (t-statistics) Institution R
2
Algeria 0.500  (1.74) -0.910  (-1.42)  M 0.30
Bolivia 0.242  (0.88) -1.252  (-1.19)  C 0.14
Brazil -9.711  (-1.95)* -2.956  (-1.86) M+P 0.28
Chile 0.590  (3.22)** 4.830 (2.97)
a P 0.71
Colombia -1.998  (-2.40)** -0.990  (-3.99)** M+P 0.67
Costa Rica -0.200  (-0.76) -0.581  (-2.02)* P 0.27
China 0.580  (2.50)** 2.520  (1.89) M 0.42
Egypt 0.630  (0.71) 1.128  (2.68)** M+C 0.59
India 0.308  (2.23)** -4.376  (-5.65)** M 0.81
Indonesia 0.795  (5.14)** 1.075  (1.24) M 0.75
Israel -0.715  (-2.21)
b -1.416  (-3.01)** -0.138  (-0.97) M+P 0.45
Japan 0.698  (2.78)** 0.279  (0.91) M 0.45
Kenya -0.431  (-1.58) -11.360  (-0.39) C 0.26
Korea -0.580  (-0.64) -0.570  (-2.85)** M+C+P 0.60
Malaysia 0.656  (3.38)** -0.300  (-0.10) P 0.51
Mexico 0.280  (1.83)* -2.950  (-3.34)** -0.001  (-0.00) M+P 0.85
Morocco 0.359  (1.13) -1.379  (-0.81) M 0.16
Nigeria -0.126  (-0.31) -2.455  (-1.64) P 0.43
Pakistan -0.127  (-0.36) 0.971  (1.09) 0.259  (0.79) M+C 0.31
Peru 0.511  (2.31)** -0.720  (-0.58) -0.220  (-0.73) M+P 0.50
Philippines -0.154  (-0.39) -0.157  (-2.05)* M+P 0.42
Poland -0.800  (-0.53) 1.465  (1.94)* M+C 0.37
Sri Lanka 0.517  (1.85)* 0.040  (0.06) M 0.24
Saudi Arabia 0.881  (2.27)* 0.160  (0.08) M 0.43
Tunisia -0.390  (-0.34) M 0.01
Turkey 0.279  (1.44) 0.020  (0.00) C 0.54
Venezuela 0.459  (1.06) 0.890  (0.50) -0.177  (-0.61) M+P 0.19
Note:  




Two and one asterisks (** and *) denote significance at the five and ten percent levels, respectively.
aThe coefficient on world price has been converted to a net import demand elasticity.
bIncorrectly signed.
.